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REID v. COVERT, ET AL.

1957]

Court Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Dependents
Overseas

-

Unconstitutional

Reid v. Covert' and Kinsella v. Krueger2
Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith were tried and convicted by
courts-martial of the alleged murder of their respective
husbands, members of the United States military forces
stationed outside the continental limits of the United States.
Both women were returned to the United States and confined at the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson,
West Virginia. Mrs. Smith's conviction was affirmed by
the Board of Review and the Court of Military Appeals,
while Mrs. Covert's conviction was set aside by the Court
of Military Appeals and she was transferred to the District
of Columbia jail to await rehearing by court-martial at
Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

1353 U. S ...
2Ibid.

, 77 S. Ot. 1222 (1957).
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Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed in Mrs.
Smith's behalf and by Mrs. Covert, contending the prisoners
were not subject to court-martial jurisdiction because
Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice3
violated Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing the right to trial by
jury to civilians. Mrs. Covert's petition also contended that
whatever jurisdiction the military may have acquired to
try her under Article 2(11) was lost by her return to the
United States and delivery to the custody of civilian authorities. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ordered the writ to issue on Mrs. Covert's
petition and the government appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court. The District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia issued a preliminary writ on the
petition filed in Mrs. Smith's behalf, but after hearing, discharged the writ. While an appeal was pending before the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Government
itself sought certiorari.
In the original hearing, the Supreme Court held the
provision of the Code extending court martial jurisdiction
to civilians accompanying armed forces abroad in peacetime did not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury,
and further held that such jurisdiction, once validly attached, was not lost by the transfer of the civilian to a4
penal institution in the United States after her conviction.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented, indicating a belief the majority opinion
would give to the military "new powers not hitherto
thought consistent with our scheme of government",' but
postponed filing their dissents until the next Term of
Court. In an unusual "reservation", Mr. Justice Frankfurter neither concurred with nor dissented from the majority opinion but, after strongly criticizing that majority
opinion, reserved for a later date the expression of his
views.
8
70 Stat. 911 (1956), 50 U. S. C. A. 1552 (11) (1956).
Persons subject to this chapter (Article 2) :
"(11) Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which
the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of
international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States

and without the following territories: That part of Alaska east of longitude one hundred and seventytwo degrees west, the Canal Zone, the
main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands;"
'Reid v. Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956) ; Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470
(1956).
5
Ibid, di8. op. 485, 486.

1957]

REID v. COVERT, ET AL.

Petition for rehearing in the cases as consolidated was
granted' and counsel were invited to include discussion of
four questions 7 relating to the practical necessity for and
alternatives to court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents overseas, historical evidence bearing on the scope
of court-martial jurisdiction, and the relevance of any distinction between civilian employees and civilian dependents and between major crimes and petty offenses. On the
rehearing, the Court reversed its earlier decision,' holding
Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert could not constitutionally be
tried by military authorities and ordering their release from
custody. Mr. Justice Brennan joined the three Justices
who had dissented at the first hearing in the new majority
opinion, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Harlan concurred in separate opinions. Mr. Justice Clark
and Mr. Justice Burton dissented.
In its first decision, the Court conceded that trial by
court-martial of a civilian entitled to trial in an Article III
court would be a violation of the Constitution, 9 but it found
the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III
court in a foreign country for offenses committed there by
an American citizen. Relying on the decisions in In re
Ross 10 and the "Insular Cases",' the Court stated that Congress had the power to establish legislative or consular
courts and, since the choice among different types of legis352 U. S. 901 (1956).
Ibid:

"'1. The specific practical necessities in the government and regulation of the land and naval forces which justify court-martial Jurisdiction over civilian dependents overseas; the practical alternatives to the

exercise of jurisdiction by court-martial.

"'2. The historical evidence, so far as such evidence Is available and
relevant, bearing on the scope of court-martial jurisdiction authorized

under Art. I, §8, cl. 14, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and bearing on the relations of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in Interpreting those clauses. In particular, the question whether
such historical evidence points to the conclusion that the Art. I, §8,
cl. 14, power was thought to have a fixed and rigid content or rather
that this power, as modified by the Necessary and Proper Clause, was
considered a broad grant susceptible of expansion under changing
circumstances.
"'3. The relevance, for purposes of court-martial Jurisdiction over
civilians overseas In time of peace, of any distinction between civilians
employed by the armed forces and civilian dependents.

"'4. The relevance, for purposes of court-martial Jurisdiction over
civilian dependents overseas in time of peace, of any distinctions between major crimes and petty offenses'."

SSupra,n. 4.
"Ibd,474, citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
20140 U. S. 453 (1891).
1 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901) ; Hawaii v. Manklchi, 190 U. S.
197 (1903) ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922).
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lative tribunals "is peculiarly within the power of Congress","2 the power to establish such courts necessarily includes the power to provide for trial before a military tribunal if that choice is "reasonable and consonant with due
process", is
In the second hearing, the Court could find no constitutional basis for military trial of the prisoners but rather
"under our Constitution courts of law alone are given power
to try civilians for their offenses against the United
States". 4 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred on
the narrow ground that the constitutional bar applied to
the trial by court-martial in capital cases of civilian dependents accompanying members of the armed forces
abroad in peacetime. The reversal resulted from an
analysis - actually, three separate analyses - of the power
of Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, of the Constitution "'to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces'" - a power the Court
found "no need to examine" in its first opinion."
Civilian courts are the normal repositories of power to
try persons charged with crimes against the United States
and the Constitution has provided a number of specific safeguards to protect persons brought before these courts."
The jurisdiction of military tribunals, in the words of the
four Justices joining in the Court's opinion, is a "very
limited and extraordinary jurisdiction"' 7 arising out of the
Article I power, the scope of which cannot be so extended
by the "Necessary and Proper" Clause 8 to permit military
jurisdiction over any other group of persons than those
literally in the land and naval forces. 9 "Having rmn up
against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of
Clause 14'.2 °
Neither the concurring Justices nor the dissenting Justices could find such rigid confines on the power of Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of
Supra,n. 4, 478.
Ibid, 476.
"353 U. S....
... 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1243 (1957).
351 U. S. 470, 476 (1956).
'OSupra, n. 14...
, 1232-3, citing Article III and the Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments.
Ibid, 1233.
IsArt. I, §8. cl. 18.
19Although the Court recognized '"there might be circumstances where a
person could be 'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear
a uniform." Supra, n. 14, ... , 1233.
20Ibid.
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the land and naval forces. The power cannot be looked at
in isolation as "It]he Constitution is an organic scheme of
government to be dealt with as an entirety"."1
Thus viewed, Justice Frankfurter stated the question:
".... whether these women dependents are so closely
related to what Congress may allowably deem essential for the effective 'Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces' that they may be subjected
to court-martial jurisdiction in these capital cases,
when the consequence is loss of the protections afforded
'22
by Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
In reaching a negative answer, he emphasized that the
Court was only dealing with the trial of civilian dependents
in capital cases in time of peace. Unable to accept the
theory that the Article I power is incapable of expansion
under changing conditions, Justices Harlan, the only Justice reversing his view between the first and second opinions, found a rational connection between the court-martial
jurisdiction invoked and the Article I power supplemented
by the "Necessary and Proper" Clause but found capital
cases to be on sufficiently different footing from those involving other offenses to warrant the full protection of trial
by an Article III court.
The dissent 23 referred to the Court's decision in the Toth
case 24 where "Art. I, §8, cl. 14 was 'given its natural meaning' and 'would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction
to persons who are actually members or part of the armed
forces'." Reviewing the practical situation which exists at
military bases throughout the world and the "effect of such
a double standard on discipline, efficiency, and morale", and
the impracticality or undesirability of the alternatives to
court-martial jurisdiction, Justices Clark and Burton concluded that the provision of the Code establishing the military jurisdiction is reasonably related to Congress' power
to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.
In reversing the earlier decision, the four Justices composing the Court did not overrule In re Rosse and the
"Insular Cases"," which provided that earlier decision's
Supra, n. 14, cone. op.......
1243, 1245.
Ibid.
Supra, n. 14, di8. op......
1262, 1266.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
140 U. S. 453 (1891).
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901) ; Hawaii v. Mankichl, 190 U. S.
197 (1903) ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922).
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precedents, but it relegated those decisions to the limbo of
obsolescence: "At best, the Ross case should be left as a
relic from a different era",27 and "it is our judgment that
neither the (Insular) cases nor their reasoning should be
given any further expansion". 28 Again, both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan, though concurring, join the dissenting Justices in attempting to preserve the validity of
the Ross and the Insular Cases decisions, at least to the extent of their narrow, specialized settings. In fact, Justice
Harlan cites these much-battered decisions as authority in
his concurrence.
Probably the two most pertinent criticisms of the decision of the Court are those raised by the dissent. In reversing two prior majority decisions in these cases, the
Court does not do so with a majority opinion. Rather, it
delivers three opinions which are farther apart in some
ways than the concurring opinions and the dissent. Four
Justices see the Bill of Rights as a "bulwark" against Congressional power to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces. Justice Frankfurter views the power and the rights as co-equal threads
from the same Constitutional fabric, while to Justice Harland the value of the Article III rights increases or decreases when measured against the Congressional power,
depending on the gravity of the offense or the possible
punishment involved.
But the most serious criticism raised by the dissent is
that the Court "gives no authoritative guidance as to what,
if anything, the Executive or the Congress may do to
remedy the distressing situation in which they now find
themselves".2 9 The geographic and numerical extent of
United States military installations and personnel abroad
requires the hiatus created by this decision be filled - a
repair job which could much more satisfactorily be done
had the Court at least indicated which materials might be
acceptable.
RPCHARD R. SIGMON
2 353 U. S.......
77 S. Ct. 1222, 1228 (1957).
28 bidg ..... 1229. Parenthetical material supplied.
2Supra,
n. 27, dis. op., ... , 1262.

